The paper specifies and estimates a hybrid McCallum-Taylor monetary policy reaction function for the Dominican Republic (DR). The estimated reactions suggest that the Central Bank of the DR has been biased towards targeting the exchange rate. These findings are in line with the evidence on the fear-of-floating characteristic of developing countries. An evaluation of the estimated rule's historical performance shows that monetary base growth below (above) that implied by the 'average' policy reaction is associated with better (worse) macroeconomic performance.
Introduction
How do monetary authorities react to developments in the economy? This pressing issue has been widely addressed in the recent theoretical and empirical monetary economics literature (e.g. Clarida et al., 1998; Taylor, 1999) . These studies have, however, mainly focused on advanced economies, and particularly on the behaviour of the United States' Federal Reserve, whereas little work has been undertaken for developing countries.
The objective of this investigation is to analyse a monetary policy reaction function for the case of a small developing economy, namely the Dominican Republic (DR). Despite the fact that the explicit guidelines that central banks in developing economies ascribe to when taking their policy decisions would appear to be intractable for obvious institutional reasons, empirical evidence could help determine the fashion in which they implicitly react to key economic developments. As Taylor (1993) notes, it could be useful to employ the concept of a feedback policy rule even in a framework in which it is difficult, if not impossible, to follow a certain rule mechanically.
The contribution of the paper is to determine if/to what extent the Dominican Republic's monetary authorities have reacted in a rule-like fashion. 1 Organised thinking on phenomena such as, for example, that highlighted by Dornbusch & Giovannini (1990 , pp. 1290 -1291 ) "Interestingly . . . in the case of the Dominican Republic, a one-to-one fixed exchange rate was made a provision of the constitution. And even that was not enough to stop fiscal and monetary policies ultimately inconsistent with the fixed exchange rate", could benefit from the outcome of the investigation.
The paper focuses on the calculation of the approximate direction and magnitude of the monetary authorities' reactions. Particularly, have the parameters of a hypothetical central bank's reaction function been constant through time? How can the econometric outcome of estimating such a function be rationalised (a) economically and (b) institutionally? Does the estimated 'implicit rule' provide useful information on the monetary authorities' policy stance in specific periods?
The rest of the investigation tackles these questions as follows. The next section provides an overview of monetary policy in the Dominican Republic. A McCallum -Taylor monetary policy reaction function for the Dominican Republic follows. The time series econometric analyses and corresponding economic interpretation of such a relationship are then undertaken before an assessment of the estimated rule's historical performance is provided. The final section concludes.
Monetary Policy in the Dominican Republic
The Central Bank of the Dominican Republic (CBDR) was founded, and the Dominican Peso (DR$) first introduced, in 1947. As stipulated in the Monetary & Financial Law, the Governor of the institution is appointed by the constitutionally elected president of the country for renewable twoyear terms. 2 Additionally, the Secretary of Finance and the Superintendent of Banks are members ex-officio of the Monetary Board. Six additional 1 It is worth emphasising at the outset that the investigation does not provide an assessment of what would have been, or could be, the most suitable monetary policy framework for the DR. Mishkin & Savastano (2001) , for example, explore such an issue for Latin America as a region, although the DR is not amongst the countries they consider in detail. members complete the Board, and they are also appointed for renewable two years terms.
A further interesting aspect to highlight is that monetary policy in the DR has been virtually the same for over three decades. Instruments such as foreign exchange market interventions (e.g. Sarno & Taylor, 2001) and domestic credit to the government have been amongst the key elements in the CBDR's policy toolkit during most of its history. However, from the beginning of the 1990s the CBDR has increasingly implemented 'less direct' instruments such as open market operations, chiefly by issuing short-term papers called CBDR's Certificates of Participation.
The use of that type of instrument has not, however, significantly diminished the active implementation of the more traditional ones highlighted above. More likely they have complemented each other. Nonetheless, given the financial underdevelopment of the DR, the oligopolistic structure of its commercial banking system, and the (probably) limited credibility of the monetary authorities with the general public, the effectiveness of the Certificates of Participation, or of any other comparable instrument, is likely to be limited, at least under the prevalent institutional setting.
An additional point to note in relation to monetary policy making in the DR is how the exchange rate market has been organised. The DR has for a long time had a 'multiple' exchange rate regime. At present, the system is composed of the official, banking system, and extra-banking system (parallel) exchange rate markets. It should be pointed out that although the economy's foreign exchange market has historically been a multiple one, the parallel market is arguably the crucial one to look at. The monetary authorities could, and have in the past tried, under adverse circumstances (e.g., bubbles, speculative attacks, or other non-real elements), to influence the market exchange rate.
A McCallum-Taylor Reaction Function for the Dominican Republic
In attempting to estimate a monetary policy reaction function for the Dominican Republic particular attention has to be given to its specification. The most likely (primary) demand management instrument to be used by the monetary authorities in a developing country is the monetary base, or highpowered money. 3 Such a variable can be expressed as H ¼ R þ C, where H is the monetary base, R are official foreign exchange reserves, and C is domestic credit. Monetary policy instruments frequently employed in developed countries, e.g. interest rates (Bernanke & Blinder, 1992) , are less likely to be implemented, given the unique transmission mechanism of monetary policy in developing economies (Montiel, 1991) . For instance, in the DR, ceilings were imposed on market interest rates until the beginning of the 1990s. 4 Interventions in the foreign exchange market can affect the economy mainly by affecting H. 5 Changes in H subsequently generate changes in broader monetary aggregates, e.g. M1 or M2, interest rates and the exchange rate. The mechanics of changes in the stock of money that arise from interventions in the foreign exchange market can be illustrated by making reference to Table 1 , which synthesises the balance sheet of a central bank.
The liabilities side of the monetary base is composed of currency and deposit liabilities to banks. Net worth of the financial authorities includes accrued spending surpluses, net interest receipts, and capital gains on their holdings of net domestic and foreign assets. Henceforth,
In equation (1) DC represents net domestic assets (NDA) minus net worth (NW) (DC ; NDA À NW), that is, the amount of domestic credit made available by the monetary authorities.
In the context of the present investigation it is worthy to note that, when an intervention in the foreign exchange market is not sterilised, a sale (purchase) of foreign exchange generates a decrease (increase) in the stock of money. 6 Notably, such an intervention would have the same impact on monetary liabilities as an open market operation.
The difference between the two policies is that the former impacts on M through a change in domestic asset holdings, whereas the latter does so via a change in foreign asset holdings. In contrast, if intervention is sterilised it could work through a portfolio channel, which alters the composition of the portfolios held by economic agents, or a signalling channel, which captures the effect of interventions in the foreign exchange market on agents' expectations about the future path of monetary policy.
Turning to the targets of monetary policy, it could be argued that, since the DR has for a long time had a multiple exchange rate regime, some sort of exchange rate indicator should be one of the key (implicit) central bank's targets. Historically, the official exchange market has been utilised for various purposes, e.g. foreign exchange rationing, not only in the DR but in many developing countries as well. However, the most important have been the service of the foreign debt and the purchase of oil. Henceforth, 4 Young et al. (1999) provide a concise description of financial repression in the DR, which was considerable until the wide-ranging economic reforms undertaken at the beginning of the 1990s. 5 The following exposition draws on Sarno & Taylor (2001) . 6 Recall that sterilisation of an intervention in the foreign exchange market can be achieved by sales or purchases of domestic currency or bonds by the central bank. The objective is to offset the effect of changes of holdings of net foreign assets on the monetary base by changes in net domestic assets holdings. devaluation generates an automatic increase in (at least) both the prices of the debt service and all products derived from oil.
The other variables (implicit targets) worth considering in a reaction function for the DR are relatively standard in the literature. Specifically, reactions of the central bank to an output gap (See Clarida et al., 1999) and to an inflation gap are allowed for. Therefore, a hypothetical monetary policy rule for the DR can be written as
where Dh is the change in the monetary base; (y 2 y Ã ) is the output gap, where y is actual and y Ã potential real GDP; (e m 2 e o ) is the difference between the nominal market exchange rate (e m ) and the nominal official exchange rate (e o ); (p À p Ã ) is the inflation gap, where p is actual and p Ã trend inflation; and 1 is expected to be a well-behaved disturbance term. b 0 , b 1 , b 2 , and b 3 are coefficients to be estimated empirically.
In equation (2) can be seen as a hybrid McCallum-Taylor monetary policy reaction function (see McCallum, 2000) , in which the monetary base reacts to the developments over time in the series (y 2 y Ã ), (e m 2 e o ), (p À p Ã ), or to all. 7 Such an equation appears suitable to capture the objectives of the CBDR: to promote and maintain monetary, exchange rate, and credit conditions that help sustain the purchasing power of the DR$, internal price stability, and economic growth.
It is worth emphasising that the crucial target in equation (1) is (e m 2 e o ), a differential the authorities would want to keep as small as possible. The larger is (e m 2 e o ) the higher is the probability of a collapse of the official exchange rate regime; b 2 , 0 would be observed if the authorities are willing to defend the official rate from bubbles, speculative attacks or other non-real factors. 8 An intuitively similar central bank behaviour is proposed in Genberg (1989) . Basically, Genberg argues that it might be desirable for central banks in small open economies to include the exchange rate in their loss functions.
Such an outcome could be generated mainly by depletion of foreign reserves (e.g. Lizondo, 1987; Sarno & Taylor, 2001) , but could also be paired with a reduction in domestic credit (i.e. a contraction of the monetary base), in order to reduce liquidity. 9 However, under adverse, real, circumstances, it is difficult (if not impossible) to keep indefinitely an overvalued currency (see Garber & Svensson, 1995) .
The output gap in equation (2), (y 2 y Ã ), is intended to serve as a measure of whether the economy is above (below) its potential, and therefore of inflationary (deflationary) pressures. So, b 1 , 0 could be expected, unless the authorities follow a lean with the wind policy. Finally, (p À p Ã ) accounts for the reactions of the monetary authorities to inflationary developments. Therefore, b 3 , 0 should be expected.
Empirical Analysis

Data
The econometric estimation of the hypothetical reaction function, rationalised in the previous section, will be undertaken using annual data for the period 1969-2000. 10 (Table A1 in the Appendix furnishes further details on the data at hand.) For the purpose of the enquiries that follow, the key monetary policy indicator is given by the change in the log of the monetary base (Dh). The nominal official and market exchange (sell) rates are also in logs. The inflation gap (p À p Ã ) and output gaps (y 2 y Ã ) are expressed as deviations of inflation and log real GDP from their potential values, p Ã and y Ã , respectively. The estimation of trend inflation and potential real GDP are achieved by passing p and y through the Hodrick-Prescott filter (HPF) (Hodrick & Prescott, 1997) . A value of 6.5 is used for the HPF's smoothness parameter l, as suggested by Ravn & Uhlig (2002) for the analysis of annual data. 11 Preliminary, visual, information on the behaviour of the data described above can be obtained from Figures 1 and 2 . Figure 1 reflects the dramatic depletion of net foreign exchange reserves that took place in the lead up to the collapse of the exchange rate regime in 1985. During this interval the country had to sign three agreements with the IMF, in January 1983, September 1984 and January 1985, ending with the first devaluation of the official exchange rate in January 1985.
Also of interest is the portrayal in Figure 2 of the output gap and inflation gap measures, in the light of the concerns that surround the statistical Monetary Policy Reaction Function for the DR 569 application of the HPF (e.g. Harvey & Jagger, 1993) . Figure 2 depicts that near the mid 1970s real GDP was above its long-run potential, declining below it at the beginning of the 1980s, probably as a result of the second oil price shock. 12 Afterwards, the output gap increases again until real GDP falls below its trend level around 1985-1986, which happens to be a burdensome stabilisation period after the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime in 1985. Subsequently, a widening in the output gap can be perceived until just before the start of the 1990s, when a downturn of actual relative to potential real GDP is apparent. Figure 2 also reveals that developments in the output gap tend to precede similar swings in the inflation gap, as could be expected.
Before proceeding to the formal econometric analyses, the univariate characteristics, notably the order of integration ½I(d), of the series involved in the analysis have to be examined. In order to do so Dickey -Fuller and augmented Dickey -Fuller unit root tests are implemented. The results, which are exhibited in Table 2 , point to the fact that the series under scrutiny do not contain a unit root in their levels, i.e. they are I(0). Consequently, the OLS analyses of the levels of the variables to be undertaken later should provide reliable, non-spurious, estimates. 
Notes:
The ADF test is based on a regression of the form
where 1 t is a random error term, and a and t are a constant and time trend, respectively. The ADF test corresponds to the value of the t-ratio of the coefficient f. The null hypothesis of the ADF test is that y t is a non-stationary series, which is rejected when f is significantly negative. If i ¼ 0 the test is the Dickey-Fuller (DF). Adding one lag to the ADF equation proved to be adequate for all the series under consideration. A constant was included in the regressions. For (e m À e o ) the DF test is reported. ÃÃ and Ã denotes rejection of the unit root hypothesis at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Estimations
The version of equation (2) to be estimated can be written as
Equation (3) is an autogressive distributed lag, or dynamic linear regression, model of orders (m, n) ½ADL(m, n)] (see Hendry et al., 1984) . The main economic intuition behind a relation like that in equation (3) is that the central bank probably acts gradually, i.e. it smoothes changes in its policy instrument Dh (through the estimated coefficient u), and might not have total control of the mechanism under consideration. 13 It is also important to note that equation (3) comprises reactions by the monetary authorities to past, current and (implicitly) future economic developments. The latter applies given that e m can be considered a forward-looking asset (see Svensson, 2000) . Statistically, equation (3) could help to account for the usual complications introduced by preliminary, as well as wrongly measured data. Consequently, allowing for lagged, as well as contemporaneous, reactions by the monetary authorities appears to be sensible. 14 In computing equation (3) an initial lag length of 2 is adopted, i.e. an ADL(2, 2). 15 Such a specification would seem appropriate as a starting point in the present analysis, notably given the annual frequency of the data. Also, note that equation (3) incorporates an impulse dummy variable, DUMMY1985, with a value of 1 in 1985 and 0 otherwise. The timing and nature of the dummy is given by the year in which the first devaluation of the official DR$/US$ exchange rate took place, which is arguably the most critical event in the period under scrutiny (see Figure 1 ). 16 Equation (3) is estimated using an automated model selection technique. Specifically, the model is computed using a general-to-specific (GETS) automatic technique-PcGets. The method in question makes operational the ideas developed by Hoover & Perez (1999) -which advanced an algorithm 13 Note the pervasive role of uncertainty in this type of function, a topic that is still not well understood by economists. See, for example, Goodhart (1999) for insights on the subject. 14 Equation (3) also encompasses a popular specification in the monetary policy reaction function literature in which the central bank does not react contemporaneously to economic developments. Hendry et al. (1984) label this variant of the ADL a dead-start model. 15 It could be the case that the explanatory variables being modelled are endogenous and therefore OLS is not the adequate technique to apply. However, Wickens & Breusch (1988) have shown that the instrumental variables (IV) estimation of a 'transformed' ADL model (e.g. Bewley, 1979) like equation (3) provides the same estimates and standard errors as OLS estimation. See also Banerjee (1990) . 16 The official exchange rate had been DR$1.00 ¼ US$1.00 since the foundation of the CBDR in 1947.
Monetary Policy Reaction Function for the DR 571 to reproduce the GETS methodology-alongside Hendry's approach to empirical econometric modeling (e.g. Hendry, 1995) . The automated GETS approach starts the specification search from a general unrestricted model (GUM) that is assumed to represent the data-generating process (DGP). On the reliability of the approach, Monte Carlo experiments by Hendry & Krolzig (2001 , 2003 show that estimates obtained with the computer program PcGets are close to those recovered from the actual DGP.
The parsimonious, reduced, model for the period 1972-2000 is 
In equation (4) ÃÃ indicates a coefficient is significant at the 1% level (standard errors are included below coefficients). The diagnostic statistics for equation (4) are also satisfactory. Chow1 and Chow2 are the break-point and forecast Chow tests, respectively; the periods used to calculate the tests are inside parentheses. Additionally, Norm tests normality, Ar autocorrelation, and Arch autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity-probability values are displayed for each test.
Note that the automatic model reduction process implies the exclusion of the output and inflation gaps from the reduced reaction function of equation (4). However, given the leading role played by the exchange rate as a channel of monetary policy transmission in an economy like the DR, this seems a sensible modelling choice. The absence of these variables from the final empirical reaction function does not mean, however, that throughout this period the monetary authorities did not pay attention to them. One can tentatively conclude, however, that they do not contain statistically significant information on the developments in the monetary policy instrument above that contained in the exchange rate indicator. That is, the empirical central bank reaction function reflects an exchange rate bias during the period under scrutiny.
The outcomes show that the coefficient on the variable (e m À e o ) t is negative, significant at the 1% level, and displays a reasonable magnitude (20.91). The coefficient l is also negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the coefficient u, which has a value of 0.15 that is significant at the 1% level, suggests the practice of instrument smoothing by the monetary authorities.
As Sack & Wieland (2000) show, instrument smoothing (defined as a gradual adjustment of the monetary policy instrument, i.e. Dh) is a distinctive feature of many central banks. These authors argue that instrument smoothing can be attributed to (a) the central banks' desire to exploit economic agents' forward-looking expectations, mainly through the expectations channel of monetary policy; (b) data uncertainty at the time policy decisions are taken; and (c) uncertainty about the parameters affecting the economy, as analysed in Brainard's (1967) seminal paper. 17 A further element arising from equation (4) is the coefficient on the variable (e m À e o ) tÀ2 , 2.30, which is positive and significant at the 1% level. However, given the economically and statistically reasonable contemporaneous effect captured by the coefficient of (e m À e o ) t , the statistically significant effect of (e m À e o ) tÀ2 on the relationship at hand probably emerges due to pervasive dynamics underlying the data under study.
Robustness Check: GMM Estimations
In order to ascertain the robustness of the outcomes generated by the OLS dynamic regressions reported in the previous section, the study proceeds to investigate the DR's monetary policy reaction function implementing the generalised method of moments (GMM) technique (Hansen, 1982) . As noted by Wooldridge (2001, p. 95) , the GMM method is particularly useful when analysing time series, since an exercise can allow for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity of unknown forms (e.g. Clarida et al., 1998) .
Estimating the baseline reaction function (3) using GMM also yields many coefficients that are not statistically significant. Hence, the investigation proceeds to investigate the reduced equation (4) 
The outcomes from the GMM estimation in equation (5) are similar to those obtained by OLS in equation (4). Note that the asymptotic properties of the GMM standard errors endorse the validity of the estimated coefficients' statistical significance. 18 Finally, the J À statistic, which is x 2 distributed, does not reject the over-identifying restrictions. This outcome provides solid evidence on the robustness of the paper's findings.
Interpreting the Rule's Performance
What crucial facts underlie the above findings? Does the estimated 'implicit rule' provide useful information on the monetary authorities' policy stance in specific periods? In the context of the present study, these questions can be tackled by analysing the divergence of actual policy from the trajectory implied by the historical behaviour. Econometrically, this implies observing the difference between the actual and fitted values for the monetary policy instrument Dh. Figure 3 exhibits the residuals from equation (4), which can be interpreted as a monetary policy stance indicator (MPSI). The reader should note that positive values reflect periods in which Dh was above the trajectory implied by the estimated rule, and vice-versa. Since the conclusions from the previous section are that the 'average' estimated policy rule implies an exchange rate bias, periods of relative macroeconomic stability should be associated with negative (or decreasing) values in the MPSI. Conversely, positive (or increasing) values in Figure 3 should reflect a move towards macroeconomic instability.
The historical behaviour of the DR's monetary authorities can indeed be read from the MPSI exhibited in Figure 3 . During a substantial part of the 1970s real GDP was above its long-run potential and inflation was fairly stable (see Figure 2) , to a great extent due to favourable export commodity prices and exchange rate stability. In Figure 3 this corresponds with an observed monetary base growth below that implied by the estimated rule. This policy stance changes at the beginning of the 1980s, probably as a result of the second oil price shock. It further deteriorates up to 1984, but improves in 1985, which coincides with an IMF-backed stabilisation period after the collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime in 1985.
Subsequently, Figure 3 reflects a loosening of the monetary policy stance until the start of the 1990s. The 1985-1990 lapse witnessed the highest inflation rate in the history of the DR in 1990 (see Figure 2 ), alongside a major private banking sector crisis at the end of the 1980s, the high oil prices of 1990 (mainly a result of the Gulf War), and recurrent government deficits. The MPSI in Figure 3 substantially improves in 1991 and 1992, after a standby agreement with the IMF was approved.
Following this stabilisation period the policy stance was loosened once again. However, for half a decade (from 1995 to 2000) Figure 3 depicts a better performance-with a blip in 1999. The behaviour of the CBDR after the mid-1990s could, henceforth, be interpreted as evidence that throughout that lapse its authorities have behaved in a more systematic fashion.
Such a stance could imply that the monetary authorities learn about how the economy evolves, and about the way in which their actions are transmitted, as in Bertocchi & Spagat (1993) . If the authorities are assumed to behave rationally, it is unlikely that they would be willing to nurture episodes that in the past proved to be costly economically, politically, and in terms of their reputation. The relevance of the rules versus discretion literature (Kydland & Prescott, 1977) for the case under analysis is palpable.
This last element is crucial in addressing the question of whether or not greater independence should be granted to the CBDR's authorities. A more independent central bank could, for instance, focus on targeting an inflation rate set by a suitable government body. This rule-like behaviour might be desirable from a social planner's point of view since it facilitates the process of informing the public on its actions, and could help to enhance its credibility. Moreover, theoretical and empirical models have found that greater central bank independence and credibility, alongside policies such as inflation targeting, can help to reduce the variability of inflation and output, two prominent variables in a monetary authority's social welfare function (Alesina & Summers, 1993) .
Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to specify and estimate a hybrid McCallum-Taylor monetary authorities' reaction function for the Dominican Republic. The estimated reactions suggest that the Central Bank has been biased towards targeting the gap between the parallel and official exchange rates. A historical evaluation of the estimated policy rule shows that departures above (below) the 'average' monetary policy reaction are associated with worse (better) macroeconomic conditions.
